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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE PRESENT
STATUS OF THE FLORIDA PROBATE LAW*
FRANK B. DOWLING"
Although the Probate Law in Florida is essentially a creature of statu-
tory origin and, as such, quite well fixed, it is nevertheless a subject far more
dynamic than we are prone to imagine. Through the institution of judicial
review we are presented with a flexible and changing picture, as the Supreme
Court of Florida endeavors to extend the Florida statutory law to cover the
variety of factual situations with which it is faced. Regardless of the source
of the law, whether organic or constructive, it clearly appears that the bulk
of the present and prospective activity within the field of Probate Law is
concerned with the subjects of estates by the entireties, homestead, and
dower.
ESTATES BY 'rIIE ENTIRETIES
The question of what constitutes an estate by the entireties and the
consideration of its common law derivation introduces a very interesting and
important phase of the field of Probate Law. We can say, as a matter of
fact, that a tenancy by entirety is presumed when no contrary intent is
expressed in a conveyance to a husband and wife.1 But sometimes even a
simple statement like that can become confusing. For example, just recently
the Probate Court was faced with an unusual situation in which a deed
was executed conveying property to a husband and wife and a minor child.
The question presented was what interests were held in the property upon
the death of the husband. Was the property to be divided into undi-
vided one-third interests; was it to be divided into moieties, the husband
and wife to take one half by the enitirety and the child to take one half; or
was there to be some other dispositio? Under these facts, it appears that
the property is divided into moieties, that the husband and wife take one-
half as an estate by the entireties, and the child takes the other one-half;
therefore, the survivor of the husband and wife, or the wife in this case, took
one-half of the fee with the minor child receiving the other half. Author-
*This article has been prepared from a speech given by the author on January 13,
1956, before the Miami Beach Bar Association and has been re-written and formalized
for publication in the Miami Law Quarterly by Alan B. Brody, a member of the
Editorial Board.
**h'lie tHonorable Frank Britt Dowling, County judge, Dade County, Florida,
A.B. 1935, Mercer University; LL.B. 1928, Univ. of Florida. Admitted to Florida Bar,
1928. Private practice of law 1928-51. County Judge, 1951 to present.
1. Knapp v. Fredrickson, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So.2d 251 (1941); see also Menendez
v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
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ity for this conclusion seems to be pretty well established throughout the
Country.
2
DISPOSITION OF THE ESTATE: Homestead. A homestead may be held in
an estate by the entirety. However, upon the death of the head of the
family the estate by the entirety does not descend according to tle statutes
providing for descent of homesteads. 3 That statute provides for the descent
of homesteads and, to the extent of the homestead property, makes every
testator die intestate; but where we have an estate by entirety constituting
a homestead it does not descend according to the law for descent of home-
steads, as set forth in the statute, but it goes to the survivor as an ordinary
survivorship by the entirety.4 The estate by the entirety loses its homestead
characteristics upon the death of the head of the family, unless the survivor
then becomes the head of a family as required by law to constitute a home-
stead.5
In Wilson v. Florida National Bank, the husband and wife had ac-
quired the five acres of land upon which they built their home as an estate
by the entirety. At a subsequent date the husband acquired the adjoining
and contiguous thirty-five acres, making a forty-acre tract in all, and sur-
rounded all of it by a fence. There was some evidence to the effect that a
well which supplied water to the residence was sunk on the adjoining thirty-
five acres and that one of the utility buildings on the home property may
have encroached slightly upon part of the adjoining thirty-five acres. Upon
the death of the husband, the wife succeeded to the full title to the five
acres as a survivor by the entirety notwithstanding the homestead charac-
teristics but a problem arose as to the thirty-five acres that were in the name
of the husband alone. The daughter of the deceased contended that it
was homestead property in which the wife had a life estate with the re-
mainder in fee simple going to the daughter. The wife, on the other hand,
contended that in view of the facts that the residence was on the five acres,
the daughter was an adult and had married and departed from the home,
and the wife was left on the property alone, the homestead died and she
had a right to claim dower in the adjacent thirty-five acres. The Supreme
Court properly held that the question of homestead is not determined by
what happens to the property after the death of the head of a family but
what the status of the property is at the time the head of the family dies.
2. Heatter v. Lucas, 367 Pa. 351, 80 A.2d 749 (1951); Madden v. Goztonyi
Savings and Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 Atd. 624 (1938); Bartholomew v Marshall,
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 13 N.Y.S2d 568 (3rd Dep't t939). (All determined this question
of entireties in such manner.)
3. FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1955).
4. Passmore v. Morrison, 63 So.2d 297 (Fla 1953); Wilson v. Florida National
Bank and Trust Co., 64 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1953).
5. Ibid.
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Consequently, the thirty-five acres were held as homestead property and not
subject to dower."
Devise. The devise of an estate by the entirety by last will and testa-
ment of either the husband or wife is a complete nullity.' Moreover, it
appears that the proper way to attack such an attempted devise by either
the husband or the wife in a last will would be by a petition for the con-
struction of that portion of the will.8
Bigamous Marriages. Bigamous marriages present an interesting situa-
tion wherein a man who is married and a woman other than his lawful wife
live and cohabit together as man and wife and acquire real property in both
names as husband and wife. It has been held in such case that they were
tenants in common and that one-half of the property passed to the real wife
and one-half to the other upon death of the husband. The alleged corn-
mon-law wife received only her half interest as a tenant in common and
could take nothing from the alleged husband. It would seem that herein
the Florida Supreme Court reached a very splendid and clear-cut conclusion.
Unfortunately this court can be confusing at times because just a short time
later in the case of Alexander v. Colston' we find that it held that where a
married man went through a ceremonial marriage with a woman other than
his lawful wife, the second "wife" was entitled to the full fee in property ac-
quired in their names as husband and wife by survivorship upon the doctrine
of estoppel, although the second "wife" took nothing by dower or otherwise
in property acquired in his name alone.
It might be oberved that this is one instance in which the Supreme
Court seemed to distinguish between identical property right upon the basis
of whether the illicit marital status as alleged was a common-law status or
a ceremonial status. Actually the second "wife" in the ceremonial mar-
riage was no more the wife of the decedent than the second wife in the
common-law relationship. These decisions seem strange when it is recalled
that our Supreme Court has often said that so far as the marriage relation-
ship and the rights thereunder arc concerned, once a common-law marriage
is established it is just as binding as a ceremonial marriage.''
In these cases neither marriage was valid, common-law nor ceremonial,
yet different results were obtained on the same facts except that one biga-
mous marriage was alleged to have been based upon common-law while the
other was based upon a civil ceremony. Therefore it would be reasonable
to conclude that where a client claimed to be the common-law wife of such
6. See also Nesmith v. Nesmith, 155 Fla. 823, 21 So.2d 789 (1945); Coleman
v. Williams, 146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207 (1941); Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fa. 333, 22 So.
687 (1897)
7. Hall v. Roberts, 146 Fla. 444, 1 So.2d 579 (1941).
8. Ibid.
9. Maliska v. Dion, 62 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1952).
10. 66 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1953).
11. Budd v. J. Y. Gooch Co., 157 Fla. 716, 27 So.2d 72 (1946); In re Thompson's
Estate, 145 Fla. 42, 199 So. 352 (1940).
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a spouse, her attorney might advise her that she was entitled to half of such
property; but if she said that she and her husband went down to the County
Judge and got married and that she didn't know anything about the other
wife, then the attorney could be safe in telling her that she could get it all
by estoppel.
Murder. Sometimes it becomes a serious question to determine what
happens to an estate by the entirety on a relatively unusual termination
of the tenancy-one that, although fortunately not too common, does hap-
pen on occasion. I have reference to termination by murder, such as a pos-
sible situation in Dade County when the wife is young and good looking
and the husband is old and rich. Murder dissolves the estate by the entirety
(that is putting it mildly) and creates a tenancy in common. As in the
case of a divorce, the Supreme Court of Florida has decreed that such a
dissolution by murder creates a tenancy in common with the heirs of the
wife and the heirs of the husband each taking a one-half interest in the
property formerly constituting the estate by the entirety. This was the hold-
ing in the murder and suicide case of Ashwood v. Patterson.2 This holding
by the Court, which follows the lissouri decisions,' 3 thus has the advantage
of depriving the wrongdoer of profit by his wrongful act and yet does not de-
prive him of property which is rightfully his.
Such a situation poses some very interesting questions. It should be
noted, in passing, that it may be a little unusual to reach the same result
upon the termination of a tenancy by the entirety by divorce and by murder,
for in the latter instance somebody has been unlawfully killed. The policy
of the State of Florida in its legislative enactments providing against an heir
or a legatee or devisee taking by inheritance or descent any of the prop-
erty of the deceased where murder has been committed apparently has not
been carried over completely to this situation. On the same point, there
arises the question of what the decision might be if one spouse, while in-
sane, murders the other and no wrongful or illegal intent can be imputed
to the killer by virtue of his condition of insanity. Such a problem has
not reached the Supreme Court yet, and it is possible that by the time it
does, the situation with reference to murder will have been straightened
out. It appears, however, that the Supreme Court of Florida is committed
to the doctrine that where there has been a termination of the tenancy by
the entirety through the murder of a spouse by the survivor, the property
will descend one-half to the husband's heirs and one-half to the wife's heirs.
Simultaneous Death. Another unusual situation is that of common
disaster or simultaneous death. I-low does that affect the termination of
the tenancy by the entirety? There seems to be no decision of the Supreme
12. 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); reaff'd in Hogan v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806
(Fla. 1951).
13. Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948); Barnett v. Coney,
224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
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Court of Florida on this point, and it may never reach the Supreme Court
because the Legislature wisely has anticipated the situation by providing
for termination of a tenancy by the entirety through the simultaneous
death or common disaster of a husband and wife, in Section 736.05, Florida
Statutes 1955, that half shall go to the estate of the husband and half
shall go to the estate of the wife.
PROBArE ADMINISTRATION: We may also run into the question of es-
tates by the entireties insofar as they relate to administration unnecessary.
It is well known that the husband and wife own the full fee simple title
during their respective lives and that there is no distinction between the
two, nor any division or partition. We also know that the survivor does
not take the title in a tenancy by the entirety by inheritance or succession;
he simply adheres to all of that which he formerly had, which was the
entire fee simple title; and, therefore, no part or interest in the estate by
the entirety can possibly go into the estate of the deceased spouse. Yet it
appears to be good practice that where there is property held by the en-
tirety and an attorney is able to bring an administration unnecessary pro-
ceeding, it is wise to set up, with particularity and full legal description, the
property owned by the entirety and show that it was so owned and have the
court adjudicate that the survivor owns the full fee simple title to that
property and that the estate of the deceased takes nothing therein. As a
result the public records will be cleared and a non-tax certificate can be
obtained and filed.
HOMESTEAD
Now we come to the question of homestead. If there ever was an
area of complete frustration in the law, it appears to be in trying to under-
stand, much less to discuss, homestead. However, we do know that home-
stead, while never constituting a part of the decedent's probatable estate
before the County Judge's Court, is nevertheless an almost constant element
to be considered in probate proceedings, by attorneys in the handling of
estate matters.
DETERMIlNATION OF TIlE STATUS: It is a strange thing that something
that is not even a part of the estate for probate purposes should nevertle-
less be one of the most important items that we have to consider. What
constitutes homestead real property as stated in the Constitution is fairly
elementary." It is the determination of the homestead status of real prop-
erty that causes the vast litigation incident to it. If the property in ques-
tion is a homestead, it is not subject to devise,' 5 provided that the deceased
head of a family dies leaving a widow or lincal descendants or both; neither
is it subject to administration.'
14. See FLA. CONST., Art. 10, § 1.
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.05, 731.27 (1955).
16. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.27, 734.08 (1955).
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It is well known that when the head of a family dies holding home-
stead property and leaving a widow and children surviving him, the widow
takes a life estate in the homestead property and the fee simple title vests
in the children as a remainder. If there are no children, the widow takes
the fee simple title; if there is no widow, the children take the fee simple
title.
Now, homestead is not title. It is a status of property or character of
property to be determined at the time of the owner's death and it depends
upon the property's use and the owner's position as the head of the family
residing in this state. The title to the property is not affected by the use of
it, nor is it affected by the status of the owner as the head of a family. The
Supreme Court has stated this. Title is incidental to the homestead status.
How the title shall descend or be transformed into a life estate and eventu-
ally vest in lineal descendants is purely consequential. Also it has finally
been declared that the County Judge has jurisdiction to determine the issue
of whether or not property is homestead. 8
As late as 1953 or 1954 we were finding articles written in our law
reviews posing the question of the right of the County judge to determine
the homestead status of real property. The question was, did the Consti-
tution of the State of Florida, in placing the full and sole jurisdiction in
the Circuit Court to determine boundaries and titles to real property, pro-
hibit the County Judge from determining the status of homestead? An
excellent discussion can be found in that famous treatise, "The Legal
Chameleon", 0 on the case of Spitzer v. Branning,20 in which it seems to have
been indicated by the Supreme Court that the County Judge must keep a
"hands off" policy on anything relating to homestead, notwithstanding that
in some twelve to sixteen places in the Probate Law he was required to
determine whether real proprty was homestead or not.
In 1954 XVakeman v. Noble2' presented the perfect case by which the
Supreme Court could be asked to pass upon the point. The Supreme Court
held that the County Judge did have jurisdiction to determine the status
of homestead property and to finally adjudicate that question. It was in
the same case that the Supreme Court stated that the County Judge was
not involved with title but was concerned solely with determining the ques-
tion of use, and the question of whether the owner was the head of a family
residing in this state. When the County Judge had determined those two
questions then the question of who had title or whether it was transformed
from a fee to a life estate with remainder over in fee was merely conse-
17. Wakeman v. Noble, 73 So.2d 873, 874 (Fla 1954).
18. Ibid.
19. Crosby and Millei, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption,
2 U. FLA. L. REv. at 227, 229 (1949).
20. 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1932).
21. 73 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1954).
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quential and incidental to the determination of the real questions - i.e.,"use" and "head of family" status.22
Therefore we can safely say that Vakeman v. Noble finally adjudicated
the question of whether the County Judge in Florida has the right to de-
termine the homestead status of property and make appropriate orders re-
lating thereto. In such a situation it should be fundamentally recognized
that the County Judge, in passing on that issue and adjudicating it, must
be cautious that all parties in interest and who will be affected by the de-
cision must be brought into the proceeding so that due process of law is bad.
"Head of the Family,." Much of the homestead litigation that we have
found in the courts has centered on the meaning of the term, "head of the
family". Where a man and wife live together with or without children the
problem is simple; likewise where a father or mother live together in the
home with minor dependent children. The difficulties attendant upon de-
termining when one is the "head of the family' appear in the many situa-
tions possible in human relationships where persons live under one roof and
yet are somehow divided; or where they do not live under one roof and
yet, for homestead purposes, are not legally divided.
A married woman can be the "head of the family", such as a wife
supporting an incapacitated husband. 231 A widow with dependent children,
even though they may be adults, can be the "head of the familv." 2 4 Grand-
mother and grandchild; aunt, nephew and niece, or any family relationship
where one is the head of the family and the others look to him and are
dependent upon him as such, are other examples. One of the most per-
plexing situations to determine and one in which the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have been somewhat inconsistent is the question of the head of a
family where the father or mother and an adult child or children constitute
the family relationship.
In DeCottes v. Clarkson12 it was held that actual dependency is not
the sole (and this point should be emphasized) legal test of family bead-
ship and that children living at home need not be minors or invalids in order
to sustain a claim of family headship on the part of their parent. A
healthy adult female could be dependent on her elderly mother even though
she rendered substantial services in the household. In the case of Caro v.
Caro,26 the Court held that a mother who lived with her two grown daugh-
ters who earned all their own expenses except their board was the head
of a family.
22. Id at 874.
23. Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 197 So. 328 (1940).
24. Hillsboro Investment Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So.2d 448 (1943).
25. 43 Fla. 1, 29 So. 442 (1901).
26. 45 Fla. 203, 34 So. 309 (1903).
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The same rulings do not readily appear to apply where adult sons are
involved. In Whidden v. Abbott2 7 and in Dania Bank v. Wilson and
Toomer Fertilizer Co.2 the homestead was not sustained where adult sons
were involved although very little difference in family relationship could
be observed in the rulings. However, in Cumberland and Liberty Mills v.
Keggin29 the Court held that a homestead status did exist on property of
the father notwithstanding that the son brought his wife to the father's home
when he married her and they all lived together until the father's death.
Termination of the Status. The only apparent distinction between the
Cumberland and Liberty Mills case and the Dania Bank case seems to be
that in the latter case the son went away and got married and then came
back home with his wife; whereas in the former case the son stayed home
all the time -he just brought a wife into the house.
Where the family relatonship has been severed by divorce of the hus-
band and wife and there are no children, the termination of the home-
stead status is obvious, but where the family relationship is terminated by
divorce and there are minor children we find an entirely different situa-
tion. Where a husband and wife were divorced and the wife awarded cus-
tody of a minor child and the wife and child took up separate residence
apart from the home of the husband, it was held, in the case of Osceola
Fertilizer Co. v. Sauls,30 that the homestead status of the husband's home
was maintained and that he was still considered the head of the family and
entitled to all the homestead benefits and exemptions. In that particular
case the Supreme Court dwelt somewhat upon the fact that the home-
place was an orange grove and that the livelihood of the husband, from
which he obtained money to support the minor child under the decree
of divorce, was obtained from that property. That may have influenced
the Court in arriving at its decision. The Court in the decision, however,
did recite with approval many other decisions of other jurisdictions holding
to the same effect.3 1
The duty of a parent to support a child, whether by decree of divorce
or by his general legal responsibility, appears to have great influence in the
decisions. Although the Supreme Court apparently embraces the theory
of preserving the homestead status regardless of whether or not the decree
of divorce ordered support for the child, contribution for support of the
child is an element for consideration in these instances but is not necessarily
controlling.
27 124 Fla, 293, 168 So. 253 (1936).
28. 127 Fla. 45, 172 So. 476 (1937).
29. 139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492 (1939).
30. 98 Fla. 339, 123 So. 780 (1929).
31. See also Redfern v. Redfern, 38 111. 50 (1867); Roberts v. Moudy, 30 Neb
683, 46 NAY. 1013 (1890); Speer & Goodnight v. Sykes, 102 Tex 451, 119 S.W. 86
(1909); Hall v. Fields, 81 Tex. 553, 17 S.W . 82 (1891).
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That the head of a family does not have to be a citizen of the State of
Florida to enjoy a homestead status of his property is well established.
Croker v. Croker3 2 contains an excellent discussion of the distinction between
residing in this State and being a citizen of the State and shows clearly
that citizenship is not required for one to obtain and enjoy the benefits of
homestead under the laws of the State of Florida. All that is necessary
is that the head of a family own property and that it be his home or usual
place of abode.
The Wilson v. Florida National Bank33 case has already been discussed,
with regard to the conflicting claims of a widow for dower and a daughter
for homestead, while discussing estates by the cntireties earlier, so it is not
necessary to go into that phase again. However, it is difficult to leave
the question of homestead in its relationship to estates by the entirety
without discussing Passmore v. Morrison.34 That case was a recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Florida involving the question of homestead in
which a husband and wife, owning property by the entirety which consti-
tuted their homestead, adopted a nine-year-old boy who lived with them
for some time upon the land in question. As the boy grew up he became
a problem child and was frequently placed in Juvenile Homes for correc-
tion and detention. While he was sojourning in one of those places under
order of court, the husband passed away and left the wife living alone in
the home place, the full fee title to which she took and continued to hold
by vitue of her survivorship.
At that time the boy had not been home (he had been incarcerated)
for about two years. Hc was still incarcerated three months later when the
adoptive mother passed away and left a last will and testament in which
she devised the home in which she lived to her sister. The question arose
as to whether the devise of the homeplace by the adoptive mother was good
as against the claim of homestead and the right of descent of the home-
stead property by the little incorrigible. The Court said that by virtue of
the fact that the mother did not recognize her responsibilities to the child
and because there was no love and affection existing between them, it was
not homestead property - therefore the devise was good. The Court further
said that the child had abandoned the home-place although it seems unlikely,
if not impossible, that a minor who had been sent to reform school can be
said to have wilfully abandoned his home. The mother took the full title
or retained the full title in the property because it was an estate by the
entirety. Now that was absolutely correct, but the decision also stated that:
"We know that the homestead status terminates upon the death of the head
32. 51 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1931).
33. 64 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1953).
34. 63 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1953).
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of a household unless the survivor in title (here [ie wife) immediately cre-
ates a new homestead by virtue of her continued living there in a 'head 'of
a family' status" and that by virtue of the facts that the little boy was in
reform school and she died in three months time so that he had never been
able to get home, there never was a family residing on the property; there-
fore, it was not homestead.
That case provides a very good example of one of the reasons why a
Judge may be reluctant to determine whether anything is or is not homestead
until the Supreme Court has passed on it. In the words of Mr. Justice Hobson
in a dissenting opinion35 rendered in that case: "It is indeed hard to see
where the fact that an adoptive mother refused to recognize her legal re-
sponsibility towards her wayward son would have anything to do with it.
It is hard to see where a minor child could possibly be said to have abandoned
his home when he was sent to a correctional institution under order of
court." In short, Passmore v. Morrison ought not to be given any sub-
stantial weight or significance in the determination of what constitutes a
head of a family in Florida. The implications and possible consequences
thereof make the holding very dangerous and susceptible of grave abuses.
Consider, for example, what might happen in a not too uncommon situa-
tion where a husband and wife own a home as an estate by the entirety
and have a son who is attending some out-of-town college; if the husband
were to die, and the wifc were to pass away before the son could return
home, the way would then be open for creditors to take the home away
from the son because he never had a chance to live there with the mother
as head of the family before her death. There are other possible difficulties
that may arise also; so it is not difficult to see why a holding that may lead
to possible injustices and inequities should be scrupulously avoided in the
interests of good law.
DOWER
Ve now come to a very important, although somewhat obscure, subject
of the law known as dower. Here, too, as with homestead, we have a field
about which few are well informed. Although dower existed under the
common-law in Florida it is entirely, in its present status, a creature of stat-
ute. The right of dower is exclusively in the widow and must, of course,
be based upon a valid marriage. At times when we make *a positive state-
ment we must qualify it. For example, it was just stated that dower is
exclusively in the widow. Subsequently, it will appear stated that it isn't;
that in fact a remote relative, or a complete stranger to the widow, can have
that right: Section 731.35, Florida Statutes, as amended in the Laws of
1951, gives to the guardian of a widow who is incompetent the right to
35 Justices Thomas and Roberts concurring in the dissent.
36. Laws of Fla. c. 2698 &(7L953':-
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elect to take dower on behalf of the widow at any time within which the
widow might have so done.A7
That is very fine for the widow. However, the legislature did not stop
there. Thle Section further provides that if the widow dies within the time
to elect and shall not have elected to take dower then the election to take
dower may he filed by any person who has a beneficial interest in the
widow's estate and such election shall be granted or rejected by the County
Judge as the best interests of the parties entitled to participate in the estate
of the deceased widow may require.
This appears to be carrying things quite far. The widow is dead.
Dower is supposed to be for her protection and for her benefit so that she
has something to live on for the rest of her life; the first part of the statute
wherein incompetency is considered states that the election can be made
on behalf of the widow and the County Judge shall determine that election
as the best interests of the widow may require. Suppose we have the situa-
tion of a man and his wife with no children and they are both elderly but
he has dearly beloved nephews and nieces on his side of the family and she
does not have a relative in the world that she knows. However, in Italy or
Switzerland or somewhere there is a third cousin twice removed and the
husband dies. If the widow did not choose to elect to take dower, and sub-
sequently she dies, under this statute one-third of his estate can go to that
cousin, if a claim for dower is timely made. This remotely related person
can come in and elect to take dower in that estate and deprive the close
and beloved relatives of the husband of one-third of his estate. And it
should be pointed out that this means not just one-third of his estate, but
one-third of it free from debts and costs of administration. Such a statute
perhaps needs investigation.
Section 733.13, Florida Statutes, amended in 195531 allows the County
Judge to dispense with the appointment of Commissioners to allot dower
when all parties in interest agree on the allotment of dower or that the
assets are of such a nature that dower can be assigned without the appoint-
ment of Commissioners. That was a very fine piece of legislation because
it allows the County Judge to save the estate expense in its administration
and allows grown people to make decisions for themselves.
Dower, being a creature of statute, must be strictly construed. If the
husband leaves realty and personalty, a widow electing to take dower must
be awarded one-third of the realty and one-third of the personalty and it is
error to award one-third of the gross estate from the personalty alone.-"
However, if the parties agree on it under the new statute it is perfectly
all right.
37. This section reads: "'I'he County Judge shall grant or deny the election as the
best interests of the widow may require." (emphasis added.)
38. Laws of Fla. e. 29714 (1955).
;9. In re Ginsberg's Estate, 50 So2d 539 (Fla. 1951).
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In the computation of dower to the widow upon her election, if she
has been awarded a family allowance this cannot be charged against her
dower but must first be deducted from the gross estate and then dower
computed from the remainder. In other words, whatever family allowance
the widow has drawn is taken off the top and then the remainder divided one-
third to the widow and two-thirds to the remainders. It seems to be a fairly
obvious conclusion, but nevertheless the question went all the way to the
Supreme Court of Florida whether United States Savings Bonds in the name
of the deceased but payable on death to the wife was not a part of the hus-
band's estate for the purpose of computing the gross estate for the awarding
of dower, since they never became a part of the estate and therefore could
not be included.4
1
Another interesting recent case concerning dower was one in which
a wife elected to take a child's share in the administration of the husband's
estate, and after the estate was closed she came back and sought to have
the County Judge award her dower in property conveyed by the husband
during his lifetime (in which she had not joined or released her dower).
This case appeared before Judge Blanton 42 and he dismissed that petition
with prejudice. Upon the dismissal the widow then went into the Circuit
Court and filed a suit in chancery to impress her dower upon the property
that her husband had conveyed during his lifetime, in which she had not
joined nor released her dower.
The Supreme Court of Florida held that she was estopped from claim-
ing dower in the property conveyed by him during his lifetime when she
elected to take the child's share and she was guilty of laches by waiting
until after the time for filing claims against the husband's estate had expired
before attempting to go against the property conveyed by him. 43
One question that has harrassed the Bench and Bar of Florida is the
allocation of dower in mortgaged property. A husband may acquire prop-
erty which is already encumbered by a mortgage or a mortgage may be
given to secure the purchase price of property, or a mortgage may be given
to secure the proceeds of a loan made to the husband during his lifetime.
These and other mortgage situations must be considered in awarding dower
to a widow where mortgaged property is involved. By the common law of
England and in many of the states, a mortgage is deemed to be a con-
veyance of title to land subject to redemption by payment of the mortgage.
In Florida and in many other states-in fact, in most jursdictions in the
United States-a mortgage is regarded merely as a lien for securing a debt
so that upon the execution of a mortgage, the legal title remains with the
40. In re Gilbert's Estate, 160 Fla. 528, 36 So.2d 213 (1948).
41. In re Brock's Estate, 63 So 2d 510 (Fla, 1953).
42. County Judge, Dade County, Florida.
43. Johnson v. Hayes, 52 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1951).
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mortgagor.44 If a husband cxecutes a mortgage on his property before
marriage, or if during marriage he purchases property that is already encum-
bered by a mortgage, the wife's inchoate dower will attach to such property
as against all but the mortgagee and those claiming under him. If a husband
executes a mortgage on his real property during converture, his wife's right
of dower is, of course, superior to the claims of the mortgagee unless she
releases her inchoate right by joining in the mortgage. Even in this event,
the wife is entitled to dower but her claim is subject to the right of the
mortgagee.
Where a husband buys realty during coverture and gives back to the
vendor a purchase money mortgage as security for the purchase price, the
mortgage lien is superior to the wife's dower whether or not she joins in
the mortgage. In those jurisdictions which recognize the validity of a
vendor's lien upon real property for the purchase price thereof, the vendor's
lien is superior to the wife's dower in the real property in question. In such
case the wife's dower is limited to the interest which the husband actually
acquires.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps one of the most important parts of probate law is something
which does not relate to existing law or existing decisions but relates to
something that the Real Property section of the Bar constantly brings to our
attention - that is, better legislation to attain more just results. For
example, under the laws of the State of Florida, as now provided, a widow
has nine months from the first date of publication of notice to creditors
in which to elect to take dower or to take under the will or by the laws of
descent and distribution. It is probable that the reason this period was
set at nine months was so that at the end of eight months the widow
could have thirty days in which to view the estate and see whether it was
to her best interests to take dower or to take under the will or by descent
and distribution, but there is no provision in our present law whereby a
widow can protect herself in a contested will situation where the contest
will not be determined by the final appellate court in nine months. The
same omission is noticeable with an after-discovered will, where a proper
administration has progressed beyond that length of time. Judge BlantonC
had a case not too long ago where an estate had been completely admin-
istered, down to the point of distribution, with the widow believing .that she
was the sole heir of a very substantial estate. While she was abroad on a
pleasure trip a will was discovered which materially changed her position
in that estate and which would have made it very advantageous for her to
have taken dower if she had known about it. The nine months from date
44. See 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 1 (1947).
45. See note 42, supra.
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of lawful first publication of notice to creditors had elapsed. Consequently,
one of the most needed pieces of legislation in probate law, if we are going
to keep dower as part of our laws and if we honestly believe the widow
is entitled to those benefits, is to have the law provide that she shall have
the right to elect to take dower within a given period -perhaps thirty, sixty
or ninety days after the final determination of any will contest, or within
thirty, sixty or ninety days after the discovery and admission to probate
of an aftcr-discovered last will and testament. This is so that she may at
all times be legally competent to determine what her rights and interests
in the estate are under each situation and make an intelligent choice.
It is indeed a precarious position for an attorney to be in to have to
advise a widow, in advance of a will contest which will occur beyond the
election period, whether or not to file an election to take dower. It just
cannot be done intelligently.
Attorneys have toyed with the idea of an alternative election: "I elect
to take dower if the decision goes this way and I retract if the decision goes
that way." That is a pretty silly way to have to practice law. This author
would like to suggest to the Florida Bar members that we prepare well or-
ganized and well written legislation to correct and to implement our existing
Probate Law. It is likely that we will all find the practice of Probate Law
a much greater pleasure as a result.
